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INTRODUCTION

This Article describes how reformers, who were often blocked by
Congress, were able to achieve their policy aims through state constitutional initiatives. The Constitution grants the state and federal governments shared, concurrent constitutional powers. On concurrent
powers matters, reformers might attempt either state or federal constitutional revision.1 Reformers might petition Congress for a federal
amendment to dictate national policy or to bind or homogenize the
states. But federal amendments rarely clear the two-thirds
supermajorities needed to pass Congress or the three-quarters
supermajorities needed for subsequent ratification by the states. Of
the 11,790 proposed federal amendments, only thirty-three have been
 Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a
response to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Howard University. I would like to thank
William Blake, Anthony Grasso, Jonathan Marshfield, Anthony Schutz, Stephan
Stohler, and participants in the 2021 Direct Democracy Symposium. Parts II and
III of this Article are excerpted from ROBINSON WOODWARD-BURNS, HIDDEN LAWS:
HOW STATE CONSTITUTIONS STABILIZE AMERICAN POLITICS (2021).
1. The federal Constitution delegates some powers to the federal government and
denies some powers to the states. ROBINSON WOODWARD-BURNS, HIDDEN LAWS:
HOW STATE CONSTITUTIONS STABILIZE AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (2021). The remaining powers not denied to the states are subject to concurrent state and federal
regulation under the Tenth Amendment. Id. Political actors can broadly or narrowly interpret the extent of concurrent powers to strategically channel constitutional conflict into friendly venues. Id.
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passed by Congress and twenty-seven ratified by the states.2 Scholars
have thus deemed the Article V amendment process dead letter.3
Landmark federal judicial decisions can be similarly difficult, taking
decades of coordinated litigation.4
In contrast, state constitutions are easier to revise. All state constitutions impose lower bars to amendment passage and ratification—of
the 11,635 amendments proposed to the fifty standing state constitutions, 7,695 have been ratified.5 Initiative amendments also face low
bars to passage and ratification. In Massachusetts, for example, a pro2. Article V of the federal Constitution requires a proposed amendment be passed
by two-thirds of both chambers of Congress or a convention called by two-thirds
of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V. Party realignment and congressional polarization discourage the former route, while the latter route has never been used.
Amendments must then be ratified by three-quarters of the states in convention
or legislature. U.S. CONST. art. V. The addition of states has multiplied veto players in the ratification process, further discouraging amendment. Federal courts
have affirmed Congress can subject ratification to strict time limits. See Dillon v.
Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 452 (1939);
WOODWARD-BURNS, supra note 1, at 7–8.
3. Sanford Levinson, for example, notes that “Article V constitutes what may be the
most important bars of our constitutional iron cage.” SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND
HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 160 (2006). See also Robert G. Dixon, Article V: The Comatose Article of Our Living Constitution?, 66 MICH. L. REV. 931,
931–48 (1968) (detailing the amendments to the Constitution and difficulties of
applying article V); David Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001) (arguing that the changes to the Constitution are no longer made through the amendment process but rather through
other means); ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 81–83, 99–101, 140–41, 163 (2009) (propounding that “[a]rticle V is neither
necessary nor sufficient to explain constitutional change. . . . [j]udicial review . . . has provided a mechanism for updating the Constitution, thus ensuring
that its allegedly timeless principles are applied to modern realities.”); WOODWARD-BURNS, supra note 1, at 1 (noting the longevity of the US Constiution and
how few of the proposed amendments have been ratified); Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1054
(2014) (emphasizing that informal amendments have reduced the need to formally amend the Constitution but article V nevertheless remains in use).
4. See generally Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 279–95 (1957); GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(Benjamin I. Page ed., 2d ed. 2008).
5. Amendment passage requires a two-thirds legislative supermajority in most
states. Twenty-one states require only a simple majority, though eleven of these
require approval over two legislative sessions. Ratification by popular vote is also
relatively lax. New Hampshire requires a two-thirds majority of voters for approval, Florida, a three-fifths majority, and Colorado a fifty-five percent majority.
Illinois has a provision for majority voting in election or three-fifths voting on
amendment, while Delaware does not require voter approval at all. States can
also wholly replace their constitutions by calling conventions, commissions, or
special legislative sessions. The states have proposed drafting at least 411 new
constitutions and ratified 144. WOODWARD-BURNS, supra note 1 at 1–19; see gen-
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posed constitutional initiative needs only 25,000 petition signatures to
make the ballot.6 Nearly all states use some form of simple majority
vote to ratify constitutional initiatives.7 This has yielded long, detailed state constitutions, which in turn are subject to frequent reform
by amendment.8 This frequent amendment, coupled with the federal
Constitution’s relative brevity, lets states serve as subnational “laboratories of democracy,”9 testing diverse solutions to national constitutional problems.10 Federal judges have long refused to intervene in
erally Janice C. May, Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited, 17 PUBJ. FEDERALISM 153–179 (1987).
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 10 (Audrey S. Wall &
Heather M. Perkins 2019).
But note that ten initiative states require a geographic distribution of petition
signatures, that six limit constitutional provisions or topics subject to amendment by constitutional initiative, and that constitutional initiatives fail ratification at a higher rate than do legislatively initiated amendments. JOHN DINAN,
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: GOVERNING BY AMENDMENT IN THE AMERICAN
STATES 16–19 (2018). Massachusetts also requires proposed initiative amendments receive a number of signatures greater than three percent of the total
votes cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII;
MASS. CONST. art. LXXXI. This the lowest bar in any state. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 27, 140 (1998); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF
AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 403–04 (2009); THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS,
THE BOOK OF THE STATES 10 (Audrey S. Wall & Heather M. Perkins 2019).
See generally Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 357–59 (1994); May, supra note 5 at 164–70; EMILY
ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 22–27 (2013) (highlighting that in contrast to the federal Constitution the “amendment procedures for state
constitutions promote broad popular involvement in their development.”). In
1990, state constitutions were on average 28,000 words, nearly four times longer
than the 7,591 word federal document. See Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay,
American Civil Law Origins: Implications for State Constitutions, 7 AM. L. ECON.
REV. 62, 69 (2005) (calculating the average length of state constitutions). See generally U.S. CONST. pmbl.; U.S. CONST. art. I–VII; U.S. CONST. amend. I–XXVII.
Per Louis Brandeis in 1932, “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). Similarly,
Lord Bryce wrote in 1888, “[s]tate [c]onstitutions furnish invaluable materials for
history. Their interest is all the greater, because the succession of [c]onstitutions
and amendments to [c]onstitutions from 1776 till to-day enables the annals of
legislation and political sentiment to be read in these documents more easily and
succinctly than in any similar series of laws in any other country. They are a
mine of instruction for the natural history of democratic communities.” JAMES
BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 450 (1889).
Scholars note the national Constitution’s brevity leaves some issues to subnational regulation and experimentation by state constitutional revision, including
through the initiative. See Donald S. Lutz, The Purposes of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 27 (1982); Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword:
The Direct Ballot and State Constitutionalism, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 787, 803–13, 818
(1996); Jonathan L. Marshfield, Models of Substantial Constitutionalism, 115
LIUS:

6.
7.

8.

9.

10.
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the states’ amendment and initiative processes, leaving the states to
experiment with little interference.11
Voters often use the constitutional initiative process against state
lawmakers. Circumventing or constraining state officials (including
state legislators) is one of the main, original functions of the state constitutional initiative. Between 1902 and 1918, fourteen states, mainly
in the West and Midwest, empowered voters to revise their constitutions by initiative.12 In the West, where partisan coalitions were
newer and more flexible, voters elected antiestablishment progressives and populists to draft or redraft their constitutions. These framers empowered allied voters to use the initiative, or the threat of the
initiative, to check future legislators.13 As Amy Bridges and Thad
Kousser conclude: “Direct democracy was a reform directed against
state legislatures.”14 Another four states later adopted the constitutional initiative, bringing the present total to eighteen states.15
Less has been written on the relationship between state constitutional initiatives and federal lawmaking. On concurrent powers matters, reformers can use state constitutional initiatives to circumvent
members of Congress. This Article argues that reformers thwarted by
Congress often pursue their policy goals through the relatively easy

11.

12.
13.

14.
15.

PENN. ST. L. REV. 1151 (2010); G. Alan Tarr, Explaining Sub-National Constitutional Space, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133 (2010); WOODWARD-BURNS, supra note 1.
Though note that state parties increasingly adhere to national party platforms.
See generally DANIEL HOPKINS, THE INCREASINGLY UNITED STATES: HOW AND WHY
AMERICAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR NATIONALIZED (Benjamin I. Page et al. eds., 2018);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849); Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); TARR, supra note 7, at 142–43; WILLIAMS, supra note
7, at 388–92.
Scheiber, supra note 10, at 790–95; Amy Bridges & Thad Kousser, Where Politicians Gave Power to the People: Adoption of the Citizen Initiative in the U.S.
States, 11 STATE POL. POL’Y Q. 167, 167–79 (2011); DINAN, supra note 6, at 16–19.
In the West and Midwest, Populist Party lawmakers championed the initiative as
a tool to constrain legislators captured by railroad, mining, and lumber interests.
See Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 57, 69–70, 80–81 (1982); Scheiber, supra note 9, at 790–795;
TARR, supra note 6, at 151–52; Amy Bridges & Thad Kousser, Where Politicians
Gave Power to the People: Adoption of the Citizen Initiative in the U.S. States, 11
STATE POL. POL’Y Q. 167, 167–79 (2011); DINAN, supra note 6, at 16–19. For further information on these early Western framers and state constitutions, see generally GORDON MORRIS BAKKEN, ROCKY MOUNTAIN CONSTITUTION MAKING, 18501912 (Paul L. Murphy ed., 1987); DAVID ALAN JOHNSON, FOUNDING THE FAR
WEST: CALIFORNIA, OREGON, AND NEVADA, 1840–1890 (1992); Christian G. Fritz,
The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on
State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 945
(1994); Amy Bridges, Managing the Periphery in the Gilded Age: Writing Constitutions for the Western States, 22 STUDIES AM. POL. DEV. 32 (2008); AMY BRIDGES,
DEMOCRATIC BEGINNINGS: FOUNDING THE WESTERN STATES (2015).
Bridges & Kousser, supra note 13, at 168.
See JOHN DINAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: GOVERNING BY AMENDMENT IN
THE AMERICAN STATES 17 (2018).
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state initiative process instead of traditional legislative lawmaking.
Successful state initiatives can spur interstate policy diffusion and imitation, even in states without the initiative process. States may converge or diverge, preempting or guiding subsequent congressional
intervention in the initiative process. This suggests that the state constitutional initiative process is significant not only for state constitutional politics, but also for national constitutionalism. Of course, there
are limits to the effect of state initiatives on national constitutionalism—constitutional initiatives are unavailable in many states, cannot
bind federal lawmakers, and cannot address issues subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. But on concurrent powers matters, state constitutional initiatives can vent pressure for reforms blocked at the
federal level.16
This article first offers two short, illustrative case studies tracing
this process, one from the turn of the twentieth century and the other
from the late twentieth century, the two zeniths of state constitutional
amendment by initiative. The article then concludes by considering
implications of this argument, noting how state constitutional reform
affects national constitutionalism.17
The first case addresses the campaign for direct senatorial election
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Initially, state legislators elected United States senators, though bribery and partisan
deadlocks occasionally interfered with that selection. Reformers
passed five direct election amendments in the House of Representatives between 1893 and 1902.18 But as these amendments failed
before a hostile Senate, reformers instead petitioned state legislators
to institute direct election.19 In response, between 1890 and 1912,
twenty-nine states allowed direct election of senators, though in many
cases, legislators ignored these nonbinding advisory elections.20 Parallel to this, states also allowed constitutional initiatives. Between
1902 and 1912, eleven states adopted both the constitutional initiative
and direct senatorial election. In these states, citizens used the initiative, or the threat of the initiative, to constitutionally bind their legislators to award their state’s Senate seat to the winner of the popular
vote.21 This system, pioneered by Oregon,22 demonstrated the viability of direct senatorial election. Following the institution of the “Ore16. For an elaboration of the claim, noting how state constitutionalism can resolve or
exacerbate national constitutional controversies, see WOODWARD-BURNS, supra
note 1.
17. Scheiber, supra note 10, at 798–99.
18. WOODWARD-BURNS, supra note 1, at 106–12.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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gon system” in 1902, additional states instituted direct election.23 The
Senate’s composition and interests changed as the proportion of senators selected by direct election increased from one-fifth in 1905 to fourfifths in 1909.24 The chamber passed the Seventeenth Amendment in
1912, which the states ratified the following year.25
The second case concerns fiscal reform campaigns in the late twentieth century. As federal expenditures threatened to outpace revenues
through the mid-twentieth century, fiscal reform groups like the National Taxpayer’s Union (NTU) and the National Tax Limitation Committee (NTLC) appealed to Congress for federal fiscal restraint
measures. At NTU behest, between 1975 and 1979, thirty states petitioned Congress for an Article V convention to pass a balanced budget
amendment. But fearing a runaway convention and loathe to constitutionally restrict their fiscal powers, members rebuffed the amendment
convention. Reformers instead directly lobbied conservative members
of Congress, who, hoping to please their constituents, proposed hundreds of fiscal restraint amendments. Being unable to get the crossparty majorities needed for ratification, these were mainly symbolic
measures. Between 1980 and 1994, Congress proposed 272 amendments balancing budgets, 103 on appropriations, eighty-two on item
vetoes, and forty-five on the national debt.26 Though a 1995 proposal
came close, no amendments cleared Article V supermajority thresholds.27 Stymied by Article V and congressional opposition, reformers
also looked to channel popular antitax sentiment through state constitutional initiatives. Here they met more success.28 California limited
property taxes through Proposition 13 in 1978 and state expenditures
through Proposition 4 in 1979.29 Voters nationwide followed the California example—in 1978, seventeen states attempted tax initiatives,
by 1981, forty-three states capped taxes, and by 1984, forty-four had
called fiscal responsibility referenda.30 Through the 1990s, the states
passed another five amendments by initiative and eight by referendum.31 While fiscal reform groups could not clear Article V or opposed
members of Congress or address federal budgeting and taxation, and
thus could not achieve all their initial policy goals, state constitutional
initiatives served as an alternate route to partial reform, drawing the
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 181–88.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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efforts of interest groups and venting popular antitax sentiment
through the 1990s.32
II. INITIATIVES AND DIRECT SENATORIAL ELECTION,
1890S–1910S
Until the early twentieth century, state legislators selected United
States Senators. Legislative deadlocks and allegations of corruption
prompted reform of this system.33 Congressmen had proposed seven
amendments for direct senatorial election in the antebellum years,
and at President Andrew Johnson’s behest, members proposed another sixteen between 1868 and 1877. A sustained national reform
movement began in the 1880s. During the Gilded Age, party bosses
used closed meetings to arrange Senate nominations, hiding “the real
fight in the caucus behind the scenes.”34 The caucus, Haynes explained, “meets behind closed doors; its proceedings are not a matter
of record,” nominating state legislators who, conferring with local
bosses and industrialists, then picked party loyalists for the Senate.35
The Saturday Review reported that through bribes “senatorships are
directly bought . . . [or] are indirectly bought by contributions to party
funds.”36 Partisan splits in the state legislatures often derailed the
selection process, deadlocking legislatures forty-six times between
1891 and 1905.37 Bribes sometimes broke ties, spurring ten Senate
investigations and a few resignations. In the 1890s, another nine split
state legislatures failed to fill Senate vacancies. In total, between 1893
and 1907, the United States Senate was fully seated only for the fiftyeighth Congress, a period of two years.38 New York Senator Elihu
Root thus proposed lowering the selection bar from majority to a mere
plurality, but United States senators, many loyal to their local majority party, refused, compounding the problem. As Haynes concluded,
“there is never a long contest over a senatorial election which does not
do serious harm to the interests of the Commonwealth.”39
Congress and the White House struggled to resolve the issue. Presidents James Garfield and Grover Cleveland deferred senatorial selection to state machines, as did President William McKinley, himself
selected by the national Republican boss Mark Hanna. As press coverage stirred public indignation, the Populist Party adopted a direct
election plank in 1892 and the Democratic Party did the same in 1900.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
GEORGE HENRY HAYNES, THE ELECTION
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

OF

SENATORS 39–42 (1912).
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The House proved friendliest to reform. Beginning in 1881, House
Democrats and some Western Republicans proposed direct election
amendments over Northeastern and Republican resistance, with
amendments passing in 1893, 1894, 1898, 1900, and 1902. The 1900
amendment, for example, passed the House 242 to 15, but like the
other amendments, never received a Senate vote, dying in the Committee on Privileges and Elections. House members proposed dozens
of additional amendments, but the Senate remained unmoved. The
federal courts, unable to significantly restructure the Senate, were no
more helpful.40
Progressive academics, journalists, and anti-corruption reformers
looked instead to the state legislatures. Prominent progressive political scientists like Woodrow Wilson, Charles Edward Merriam, and
George H. Haynes proposed that the state legislatures invoke their
Article I power to unilaterally set the time, place, and manner of senatorial elections. State legislators, stymied by deadlocked Senate elections, too sought to reform selection. Between 1891 and 1905, forty-six
senatorial selection votes deadlocked, on average for thirty-eight days,
nearly the length of a normal legislative session—derailing whole sessions. For example, in 1897 a faction of Oregon legislators blocked
quorum for an entire session to prevent a Senate vote. Four other
deadlocked states had to call special sessions, and six left their Senate
seat vacant, with Delaware forgoing any Senate representation in
1901. As anti-corruption measures weakened state party bosses, state
legislators urged broader reforms. For example, Washington state legislators, hoping to prevent another “tedious repetition of ballots,” resolved in 1903 to cast only two ballots and then return to “matters and
things of vital interest to the people.”41
40. See also HAYNES, supra note 33, at 36–70, 100–05 (on congressional support for a
direct election amendment); H.R. Res. 82, 70th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1928) reprinted
1976 H.R. Doc. No. 551 (compiling all proposed amendments to the Constitution
from 1889 through 1928); ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION 74–76 (1978) (highlighting that the Senate had become a “tool
of corporate interests”); RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP:
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION 61–62 (1988) (on the popular movement for direct election of senators); DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995 at 208–10 (1996)
(discussing failed congressional direct election amendments); WENDY J. SCHILLER
& CHARLES STEWART, ELECTING THE SENATE: INDIRECT DEMOCRACY BEFORE THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT (2014) (on state-level agitation for an amendment).
41. Of the 752 Senate elections held between 1871 and 1913, only nineteen failed to
select a candidate, suggesting the concerns among legislators, academics, and the
public exceeded the actual harm done. SCHILLER & STEWART, supra note 40, at
16–17; CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM, PRIMARY ELECTIONS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY
AND TENDENCIES OF PRIMARY ELECTION LEGISLATION (2nd ed. 1909). For the
Washington legislature’s resolution, see HAYNES, supra note 33, at 38–39, 65–70,
159.
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To circumvent the deadlocked and biased state legislatures, reformers proposed selection by popular vote. Haynes held that legislative selection brought gridlock to “the whole range of state and local
politics” and that underrepresentation and “misrepresentation in the
Senate” required that “elections be placed directly in the hands of the
people.” Populist and agrarian state parties soon proposed a popular
vote amendment to the Constitution, with five state Democratic parties and two Republican parties following by 1892. Reformist third
parties joined the cause, and by 1913, 220 different state party platforms had called for the direct election of senators. State legislators
next swung into action. In the 1890s, twenty-seven states across the
country sent Congress forty-five petitions asking for an amendment.
Amendments passed the House in 1893 and 1894 but failed decisively
in the Senate.42
Stymied by the Senate, state legislators instead unilaterally reformed Senate elections. Allowing the popular vote in primaries was a
first step. Between 1901 and 1907, most Southern legislatures statutorily allowed or mandated that the Democratic Party hold popular
primary elections, which, in the one-party region, effectively picked
state officers, including United States Senators. Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Massachusetts also considered
or instituted direct primaries for federal senators. But legislators in
these states could still ignore direct election results and make their
own, alternate selection. Some Western and Great Plains states thus
went further, allowing a popular vote in the general election. Nebraska voters appended to their 1875 Constitution a provision letting
the legislature call nonbinding popular elections for senators, though
counties rarely placed Senate candidates on the ballot, leaving turnout low and legislators free to ignore the results. Similarly, in 1899
Nevada legislators required that ballots include Senate candidates
but still did not bind themselves to follow the popular vote. State legislators, constrained only by statute, often ignored primary rules and
outcomes.43
Voters solved this issue by using state initiatives to constitutionally bind legislators to the popular vote. Oregon pioneered the system.
In 1901, recalling their deadlocked sessions of 1895 and 1897, Oregon
legislators resolved to award their Senate seats based on the state’s
42. In California, Nevada, and Illinois voters overwhelmingly approved their state
legislature’s popular election petitions to Congress. Petition figures from HAYNES,
supra note 33 at 38–39, 65–70, 100–115, 110–129; GEORGE HENRY HAYNES, THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE I, 85–96 (1938); RALPH
A. ROSSUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 180–81 (2001).
43. Note also that nationally, Senate primaries actually occurred in only 43 of the
121 elections in which they were authorized. See NEB. CONST. 1875, art. XVI,
§ 12; SCHILLER & STEWART, supra note 40, at 116.
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popular vote. Governor Theodore Geer reminded legislators to obey
the “general demand from the people and press of the state,” especially since “this first attempt at the popular vote for United States
senators is watched with much interest . . . in other States.” But the
legislators ignored Geer and slipped their statutory bond to the popular vote, picking an alternate candidate after a five-week deadlock.
Frustrated voters in 1904 invoked the state constitution to pass an
initiative requiring that legislators publicly pledge to accept the next
popular vote and circulated an accompanying petition promising to
oust legislators who reneged. The legislators, mainly Republicans,
could not statutorily block this constitutionally-implemented citizen
initiative, and so in the following election they folded and picked the
popularly-selected candidate—a Democrat—after only twenty minutes of balloting. Oregon voters had succeeded in using their state constitution initiative process to constrain legislators and implement
direct senatorial election.44
Eleven states imitated elements of Oregon’s initiative system. Nebraska adopted Oregon’s public oath verbatim, additionally marking
on the ballot which state legislative candidates had not signed the
oath, while North Dakota bumped these candidates from the ballot
entirely. South Carolina imposed a similar oath, and the Colorado legislature promised to expel members who voted against the popularly
elected candidate. Woodrow Wilson—who, as a scholar, had once
thought reform without federal amendment impossible—as New
Jersey Governor now came “to believe in the popular election of Senators and the primary devices by which the thing is virtually brought
about without a Constitutional amendment.” He recommended the
Oregon system to the New Jersey legislature, noting: “What I said in
my [gubernatorial] Inaugural address about the Oregon system was
simply that I commended it most warmly to the studious attention of
our own legislature.”45 Between the optional party primary, the
mandatory party primary, and the Oregon system, by 1913 thirty
states had implemented direct senatorial elections, as a House report
observed.46
44. See OR. CONST. art. IV, § 3. See also James D. Barnett, Forestalling the Direct
Primary in Oregon, 27 POL. SCI. Q. 648, 648–68 (1912) (on the development of the
Oregon system).
45. New York’s Senate too reported on the Oregon experiment. For the report and
quote by Geer, see XX DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION, 44 (1904). See also HAYNES, supra
note 39, at 130–52 (discussing the mounting support for direct election); HAYNES,
supra note 42, at 96–106, 104 n.3 (highlighting the success of the initiative in
binding the Oregon legislators to the “People’s Choice” and detailing that in a
letter to the author, Woodrow Wilson stated his belief in the popular election).
46. Scholars agree on when states instituted their primaries but disagree on when
these laws were implemented. For example, in 1908 Charles Merriam counted
twelve states with senatorial primaries, while a 1907 Senate report counted
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State legislatures used several tactics to nudge the Senate toward
amendment. First, between 1901 and 1905, nineteen state legislatures
sent thirty-two petitions calling for an Article V constitutional convention. Pennsylvania’s legislature organized an interstate committee of
correspondence to coordinate appeals, pushing the number of petitions
to twenty-seven in 1910, then to thirty-one by 1912, just short of the
thirty-two-state threshold needed to trigger a national convention and
override the Senate. Noting the possibility of a constitutional convention, the usually circumspect professor Haynes declared “we are on
the eve of seeing the final step taken in the proposing of the longdesired amendment.” Observers warned that such an Article V convention could address questions beyond senatorial selection. Senator
Weldon Heyburn warned that a radical runaway convention would
challenge Jim Crow and reopen the “bitterness of the race question.”
Worrying that “enough States will act to take it out of our hands,”
Senator Fred DuBois urged his colleagues to instead preempt a convention by agreeing to “debate this question” of amendment. Amendment, once radical, became the conservative, stabilizing option to
recognize the status quo established by the states.47
eight. See MERRIAM, supra note 17, at 273–88 (Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin); MOSES E. CLAPP, ABSTRACT OF LAWS RELATING TO THE
ELECTION OF UNITED STATES SENATORS, S. DOC. NO. 393 (1907) (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas). Romero and
Schiller and Stewart agree that Lapinski presents the most accurate and recent
data, which is largely supported by data from Rossum. See Francine Sanders Romero, The Impact of Direct Election on Reform Votes in the U.S. Senate, 88 SOC.
SCI. Q. 816 (2007); SCHILLER & STEWART, supra note 16, at 111–16; John S. Lapinski, Direct Election and the Emergence of the Modern Senate (2004), ResearchGate; ROSSUM, supra note 18, at 192 n.49.This Article therefore uses the Lapinski
data as presented in Schiller and Stewart. For another recent account, see Erik J.
Engstrom & Samuel Kernell, The Effects of Presidential Elections on Party Control of the Senate under Indirect and Direct Elections (2003). See also H.R. Res.
82, 70th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1928) reprinted 1976 H.R. Doc. No. 551 at 217–20
(compiling all proposed amendments to the Constitution from 1889 through
1928); C. H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 133 (2014) (on the state-level movement of direct
election).
47. States coordinated their petitions—as a 1901 Pennsylvania petition reminded
Congress, in total twenty-seven states had requested an amendment in some
form. Between 1890 and 1905, thirty-one states across the country sent Congress
ninety-three petitions asking Congress to propose an amendment. Twenty-six petitions came from the Midwest, twenty-two from the South, forty-three from the
West, and two from the staid Northeast. Heyburn speculated that reformers
wanted the:constitutional convention so that they can get into the Constitution
the recognition of [their] radical demands . . . All the old bitterness of the race
question would have to be thrashed out in such a convention . . . . The restriction
that insures equal representation in this body would be wiped out, as would every
other provision. 46 CONG. REC. 2745, 2772 (1911). The Socialist Party had indeed
called for abolition of the Senate in their 1908 platform. See also 35 CONG. REC.
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Further, as petitions mounted in the late 1900s, additional states
implemented direct election laws, which reformist senators periodically presented to their chamber. Praising the accumulation of these
democratic laws and petitions, in 1910 Senator Robert Owen of
Oklahoma told the chamber that now “37 States to have expressed
themselves (in one form or another) favorably to the election of Senators by direct vote.” Joined by Oregon’s Johnathan Bourne, Owen effusively praised Oregon’s initiative system and other states for
instituting direct elections, and warned that continued obstruction by
Northeastern Senate Republicans, including the obstinate Nelson Aldrich, would not deter the states from a unilateral convention or further state-level reform. Moreover, this state-level reform convinced
senators that there was indeed a national constituency backing the
impending convention. Finally, with the proliferation of state direct
election and initiative measures, the proportion of senators selected by
direct election increased, from one-fifth in 1905 to four-fifths in 1909,
when fourteen of the thirty senators won by popular vote, displacing
ten anti-amendment Republicans. These factors likely inclined the
Senate to support an amendment.48
Proposed amendments gained traction. On February 24, 1911,
George Sutherland derailed a promising amendment by appending a
clause letting Congress intervene in state elections, including in the
South, threatening Jim Crow. Conferring with Maryland’s Isidore
Rayner, Judiciary Committee Chairman William Borah recognized
the next amendment would have to cut such language to win required
Southern votes. Michigan’s William Smith agreed:
It would have been better to have confined the resolution to the direct election
of Senators without complicating the question . . . mindful of the fact that this
joint resolution must receive the sanction of two-thirds of the States . . . . We
can not afford to involve this question with sectional or race problems.

A short amendment, deferential to exiting state electoral practice,
would satisfy populists, Southerners, and the conservatives who
2611, 2617 (1902) (discussing the appeal of the people electing senators by popular vote); HAYNES, supra note 33, at 38–39, 65–70, 120–25, 159 (on the state-level
movement for direct election); ROSSUM, supra note 4, at 181–82 (discussing generally the shift to popular vote).
48. Owen added: “Only nine States . . . have failed to definitely act in favor of the
election or selection of Senators by direct vote of the people, and even in these
States the tendency of the people is strongly manifested toward such selection of
Senators.” Senator Augustus Bacon of Georgia also praised the direct election as
an anti-corruption measure. ABSTRACT OF LAWS RELATING TO THE ELECTION OF
UNITED STATES SENATORS, S. DOC. NO. 393 (1907); 45 CONG. REC. XXX, 5824–30,
7109–21 (1910); 46 CONG. REC. 2745, 2771 (1911); C. H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO
MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 150
(1995); Jay Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’
Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 500, 527–28 (1997);
ROBERT HARRISON, CONGRESS, PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AND THE NEW AMERICAN
STATE 156–91 (2004); Romero, supra note 46, at 281.
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sought to preempt a convention. The House passed such an amendment on April 13th, 1911, and Borah sponsored a matching amendment, to which Republican Joseph Bristow attached a weak federal
regulation rider, which cleared the Senate by a single vote. After sixteen weeks of foot-dragging, House Democrats in the conference committee accepted the Bristow rider as sufficiently innocuous and passed
the measure. The states, having vociferously backed direct election for
nearly a decade, ratified the Amendment decisively, completing the
process on April 8, 1913.49
Scholars have suggested that rising populism and frustration with
legislative deadlocks and corruption pushed United States Senators to
pass the Seventeenth Amendment. This is not wholly wrong, for reformist senators did indeed mention these issues through the 1890s
and 1900s.50 But the adoption and imitation of Oregon’s initiative system also helped secure passage of the Seventeenth Amendment and
likely helped avert a second constitutional convention. As historian C.
H. Hoebke explains, the state constitutional initiative paired with “the
direct primary had done its work before the convention became necessary. Twenty-nine states had instituted the direct senatorial primary,
most of them tightening the reign on legislative discretion with enactments similar to those of the ‘Oregon System.’ ” Voters then used state
constitutional initiatives to bind their state legislators to direct senatorial election. Between 1883 and 1912, thirty states implemented direct senatorial election. Eleven that instituted or implemented direct
election states also constitutionally allowed the citizen initiative. In
these states, voters could and did invoke the state constitutional initiative to constrain or punish state legislators who bucked their obligation to the popular vote, as Oregon voters demonstrated.51 In these
49. 4.6 CONG. REC. 2745, 3307 (1911); HAYNES, supra note 39, at 116–20, 250; H.R.
Res. 82, 70th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1928) reprinted 1976 H.R. Doc. No. 551 at 217–19;
ALAN GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 76–82
(1978); CAPLAN, supra note 40, at 62–65; KYVIG, supra note 40, at 211–13 (1996);
HARRISON, supra note 48, at 184–85.
50. The Democratic Party, the National Grange, and the American Federation of Labor adopted popular election planks at the turn of the century, though it failed
nearly ten-to-one at the 1908 Republican Convention. For a summary of these
accounts, see generally Todd Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public
Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV., 1015–26 (1994);
Bybee, supra note 48, at 536–47.
51. Prior to 1913, Arizona, Nebraska, and Ohio constitutionally guaranteed the popular vote in senatorial elections. ARIZ. CONST. of 1912, art. VII, § 9–20; NEB.
CONST. art. XVI, § 312; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 7. Zywicki suggests Oregon and
Nevada did so as well, though I found no record of this. Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond
the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its
Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 191–92
(1997). About a dozen states revised their constitutions after the Seventeenth
Amendment’s ratification. Between 1902 and 1912, the constitutional initiative
was adopted in Oregon (1902), Oklahoma (1907), Michigan (1908), Missouri
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states, the threat—though not always the use—of the state constitutional initiative was essential to binding state legislators to accept the
results of direct senatorial election. The success of the Oregon system,
using the state constitutional initiative to bind state legislators to the
popular vote, encouraged other states, including states without the initiative, to later adopt direct senatorial selection. This state-level band
wagoning around direct senatorial election pushed the United States
Senate to finally ratify the Seventeenth Amendment.
III. INITIATIVES AND FISCAL REFORM, 1970S–1990S
In the late twentieth century, reformers sought amendments to
curtail congressional fiscal powers, including proposals for a balanced
budget, a tax cap, an item veto. These measures won some congressional support, but also drew opposition, particularly among members
who were unwilling to constitutionally restrict their fiscal powers.
Thwarted by congressional opposition and high Article V barriers to
amendment, reformers instead passed fiscal restraint measures
through the state constitutional initiative process.52
Conservatives had long tried to cap or limit federal spending.
While emergency Treasury bonds financed expansive Depression and
wartime projects, postwar Congresses hesitated to accordingly raise
taxes, leading fiscal hawks to propose ninety budget constraint
amendments between 1943 and 1973. The 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act further expanded Congress’ budget drafting powers,
leading the moderate House Democrat Paul Simon and Senate Republican Carl Curtis to jointly propose a 1975 amendment tethering congressional spending to taxes. That year, the newly founded National
(1908), Arkansas (1910), California (1911), Arizona (1912), Colorado (1912), Nebraska (1912), Nevada (1912), and Ohio (1912). See DINAN, supra note 7, at
16–19. The statutory initiative was adopted in South Dakota (1898) and Utah
(1900). Direct election was also instituted or implemented in all these states. See
generally HAYNES, supra note 33, at 120–29; ROSSUM, supra note 4, at 181;
HOEBEKE, supra note 46, at 133.
52. These congressional amendments reflected broader popular desire to check federal and state legislators. These efforts met success mainly at the state level.
Addressing popular frustration with rising congressional incumbency, the advocacy group U.S. Term Limits helped twenty-three states cap congressional tenure. The Supreme Court overrode Arkansas’ state constitutional limit on
congressional terms, but allowed limits on state legislators’ tenure, which passed
in twenty-one states, mainly by state constitutional amendment. And while Congress tried and failed to pass dozens of amendments reversing the Court’s authorization of flag burning in Texas v. Johnson, the states uniformly statutorily
banned the practice. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989); Patrick M. Condray & Timothy J. Conlan, Article V Conventions and American Federalism: Contemporary Politics in Historical Perspective,
49 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 515 (2019); WOODWARD-BURNS, supra note 1, at
179–93.
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Taxpayer’s Union (NTU) and National Tax Limitation Committee
(NTLC) proposed stricter tax caps, alleging that the federal government, like a family, had to balance yearly accounts. The small government rhetoric mobilized disaffected white suburban voters and
lawmakers already chafing at expansive federal school integration
and bussing plans. With the Curtis amendment trapped in the Senate
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution, the NTU
instead pushed Maryland and Mississippi to directly petition Congress for a balanced budget amendment convention in 1975, reaching
twenty-two states by 1978, and thirty by summer 1979, nearing the
thirty-four-state threshold. Such a convention would not be subject to
congressional oversight and could significantly limit Congress’ budgeting and spending powers. For some members, credit-claiming for federal spending within their district was central to reelection. National
lawmakers attempted to block the amendment convention. President
Jimmy Carter and even libertarian Senator Barry Goldwater warned
against a runaway convention and Judiciary Chair Birch Bayh’s staff
noted a dozen state petitions were incorrectly filed and thus void. In
December 1979, the Subcommittee on the Constitution attempted to
derail the convention by endorsing an alternate amendment.53
Republican congressional gains in 1980 boosted prospects for a federal amendment. NTLC chair Lewis Uhler urged President Reagan to
statutorily cut taxes, which Reagan did, albeit while increasing defense spending in 1981 and pushing the 1982 budget deficit over $100
billion. Reagan then decried this deficit in summer 1982, requesting a
balanced budget amendment. Members answered this budget and deficit growth with detailed, quasi-statutory amendments. Charles W.
Stenholm’s eight-section proposal required the president transmit an
annual budget to Congress tying expenses to revenue and capping annual debt, with specified exemptions allowed by a bicameral congressional supermajority. The proposal also let Congress override these
limits following a declaration of war or of a national security emergency with bicameral majorities. However unwieldy, these amendments advanced through Congress. Replacing Democrat Birch Bayh
as Senate Judiciary Chair, the Republican Strom Thurmond joined
Orrin Hatch to draft an amendment, which, with NTU and NTLC endorsement, barely cleared the Senate on August 4, 1982. But fortunes
quickly reversed. Democrats added twenty-seven House seats in November 1982, and in 1984 and 1985, California, Michigan, and Montana rejected federal convention petitions. Frustrated with hardline
Republicans’ simultaneous deficit spending and increasingly byzantine, detailed budget constraint amendments, the liberal Republican
Senator Charles Mathias argued Congress should avoid amendment:
53. WOODWARD-BURNS, supra note 1, at 181–88.
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“I do not think we should use the Constitution as a fig leaf to cover our
embarrassment over the deficit.” Given some members’ opposition to
constraining their powers by amendment, in 1985, Congress settled
for a balanced budget statute, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. But
the Supreme Court promptly overturned the Act, spurring new
amendments, albeit increasingly symbolic ones aimed at restraining
the Court. On February 4, 1986, Reagan addressed Congress with an
alternate request: “I ask you to give me what 43 Governors have: Give
me a line-item veto this year. Give me the authority to veto waste.” He
reiterated this in his 1987 address, and members of Congress proposed dozens of item veto amendments, some members citing the state
clauses as models, which scholars credited for constraining state
budgets.54 Between feasible and longshot proposals, from 1980 to
1994, Congress proposed 272 amendments balancing budgets, 103 on
appropriations, eighty-two on item vetoes, and forty-five on the national debt.55
Facing opposition and deadlock in Congress, fiscal reformers also
undertook state constitutional revision. While these state amendments could not balance the federal budget, reformers found the
states to be a more hospitable venue. Grassroots suburban organizing
against bussing and property taxes and for the Nixon and Reagan
54. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Ronald Reagan, February 4, 1986:
State of the Union Address, MILLER CENTER, millercenter.org/the-presidency/
presidential-speeches/february-4-1986-state-union-address [https://perma.cc/
B5RT-ZPL6]; Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, How Successfully Can the States’ Item
Veto be Transferred to the President?, 75 GEO. L. J. 159 (1986); RONALD C. MOE,
PROSPECTS FOR THE ITEM VETO AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL: LESSONS FROM THE STATES
(1988); James Alm & Mark Evers, The Item Veto and State Government Expenditures, 68 PUB. CHOICE 1 (1991); COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET,102D CONG., PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS TO BALANCE THE FEDERAL BUDGET, 83,
1057, 1501 (Comm. Print 1994); COMMITTEE ON RULES, 99TH CONG., ITEM VETO:
STATE EXPERIENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE FEDERAL SITUATION (Comm. Print
1986); JAMES SAVAGE, BALANCED BUDGETS AND AMERICAN POLITICS 198–236
(1988); Balanced Budget Amendment Fails in House, in CQ ALMANAC 1982, at
391–94 (1983), library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=CQal821164709 [https://perma.cc/H2M4-XSWX].
55. Note that these amendment counts are nonexclusive, and many individual
amendment proposals included balanced budget, tax cap, and line-item veto provisions. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1975); RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME
AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE
KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 181–87 (1993); KYVIG, supra note 40, at 426–47; LISA
MCGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS: THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT (2002);
MATTHEW D. LASSITER, THE SILENT MAJORITY: SUBURBAN POLITICS IN THE SUNBELT SOUTH (2006); JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789–2015 at 37–38
(Fourth ed. 2015); ROGER C. HARTLEY, HOW FAILED ATTEMPTS TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION MOBILIZE POLITICAL CHANGE 181–87 (2017); NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE RADICAL RIGHT’S STEALTH PLAN FOR
AMERICA (2017).
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campaigns built strong Sunbelt and Southern state-level fiscal reform
networks. And while some members of Congress balked at adding detailed budget amendments to the brief federal Constitution, the state
constitutions, with lower bars to amendment, already included dozens
of lengthy clauses checking legislative budgeting, many passed by
nineteenth century framers after cyclical economic crises.56 Through
the 1970s and 1980s, fiscal reformers, addressing economic stagnation, amended their state constitutions to update these old budget
checks and institute new ones. Convention delegates imposed balanced budget amendments in Illinois in 1971 and Tennessee and Hawaii in 1978, as did voters in Maryland in 1974, North Carolina in
1977, Virginia in 1984, and Rhode Island in 1986. By 1993, thirty-five
states had balanced budget clauses, and including statutory provisions, forty-nine states now mandate balanced budgets. These detailed measures mirrored Congress’ rejected amendments, requiring
executives or legislators provide or pass a budget in which annual or
biennial revenue exceeds expenses or debt, unless exempted by legislative supermajority.57
Reformers also channeled popular antitax sentiments toward state
constitutional initiatives. By initiative, voters imposed absolute limits
or legislative supermajority requirements on property tax increases,
restricted non-property taxes, and capped statewide tax expenditure
by population. California pioneered each approach. In 1973, Reagan
advisor Lewis Uhler drafted Proposition 1 to reduce state spending,
nudging legislators to try to curb rising property taxes in 1977. When
the attempt failed in 1978, fiscal conservatives Howard Jarvis and
Paul Gann proposed Proposition 13 to limit property taxes and Proposition 4 to limit state expenditures by population. Californians that
backed the initiatives, many of them conservative or suburban homeowners, tended to see the state’s lawmaking process as unresponsive,
56. For example, Indiana’s budget clause, dating to 1851, and West Virginia’s, from
1872, forbid legislators from assuming debt, and Nevada’s 1864 clause tethers
debt to taxes, which reformers strengthened by amendment in 1989. See IND.
CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 5; NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. XI, § 3; W. VA. CONST. of
1872, art. X, § 4.
57. Dinan also explains there is some academic disagreement whether to class debt
limit clauses as balanced budget provisions, so the count of thirty-five balanced
budget clauses is likely modest. DINAN, supra note 7 at 171–3. See also R.I.
CONST. art. IV, § 13; MD. CONST. art. III, § 52 (amended 1974); TENN. CONST. art.
II, § 24 (amended 1978); ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5
(amended 1977); HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (amended 1978); VA. CONST. art. X, § 7
(amended 1984); R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 16; Richard Briffault, State and Local Finance, 3 in STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE AGENDA
OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 211–17 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams
eds., 2006); Yilin Hou & Daniel L. Smith, Do State Balanced Budget Requirements Matter? Testing Two Explanatory Frameworks, 145 PUBLIC CHOICE 57
(2010); STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS, (2010).
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inefficient, and wasteful, soundly rejecting the legislature’s alternate,
the more moderate Proposition 8.
California triggered a landslide of tax initiatives. National media
coverage introduced Proposition 13 to three-quarters of Americans
outside California, two-thirds of whom supported similar reforms according to November 1978 polls. Voters used initiatives and referenda
to force state lawmakers into swift change. Convention delegates in
Tennessee and Hawaii, sensing the nation’s anti-tax tenor, proposed
referenda capping state taxes and expenses. In total seventeen states
attempted tax initiatives in 1978, and by 1981, forty-three states stabilized or reduced taxes. By 1984, forty-four had called for fiscal reform referenda. Congress too took note, proposing twenty-eight
amendments for national referenda between 1977 and 1983, the first
such amendment proposals since the New Deal. The movement
spread, with Lewis Uhler advising Michigan’s 1978 initiative capping
state revenue and California’s 1990 term limits initiative, Missourians passed a similar revenue initiative in 1980. Massachusetts’ Proposition 2 1/2 of 1980 statutorily reduced the state’s relatively high
property taxes, and by 1985, voters approved legislative-initiated tax
reduction amendments in seven more states. Through the 1990s, the
states passed another five initiative amendments and eight referendum amendments. These continued the fiscal reform efforts of the
1980s—for example, in the 1990s, Arizona, Oklahoma, and Nevada
passed amendments requiring legislative supermajorities for tax increases. Remarkably, respondents in California, Massachusetts, and
Michigan supported broad tax cuts while favoring program-specific
spending increases. Something had to give.58
58. Note that Isaac Martin casts the California tax revolt as a moderate homeowners’
effort to protect tax exemptions. Note also that Congress in 1971 considered a
narrowly-tailored amendment requiring a national referendum on war declarations. See NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 18 (amended 1996); TENN. CONST. art. II, § 24
(amended 1978); CALI. CONST. art. XIII A–B (amended 1978 & 1979); OKLA.
CONST. art. V, § 33 (amended 1992); ARIZ. CONST. art. 9, § 22 (amended 1992);
MO. CONST. art. X, § 16 (amended 1980); HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 9 (amended
1978); MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 26 (amended 1978); TARR, supra note , at 156–60;
DINAN, supra note 7, at 177–84; John Dinan, Policy Provisions in State Constitutions: The Standards and Practice of State Constitution-Making in the Post-Baker
v. Carr Era, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 155, 184–85 (2014); David Lowery & Lee
Sigelman, Understanding the Tax Revolt: Eight Explanations, 75 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 963–74 (1981); Daniel R. Mullins & Bruce A. Wallin, Tax and Expenditure
Limitations: Introduction and Overview, 24 PUB. BUDGET FIN. 2–15 (2004); DAVID
O. SEARS & JACK CITRIN, TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING FOR NOTHING IN CALIFORNIA
19–42 (1985); ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT: HOW THE
PROPERTY TAX TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 115–18 (2008); ARTHUR
O’SULLIVAN ET AL., PROPERTY TAXES & TAX REVOLTS: THE LEGACY OF PROPOSITION
13 (1995); ALVIN RABUSHKA & PAULINE RYAN, THE TAX REVOLT 185–94 (1982);
John L. Mikesell, The Path of the Tax Revolt: Statewide Expenditure and Tax
Control Referenda since Proposition 13, 18 STATE LOC. GOV. REV. 5–12 (1986).
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Voters rolled back some of these clauses. Although Colorado initially imposed relatively low state and local taxes, through the 1980s,
state legislators tried and failed to further lower taxes, leading Douglas Bruce, who had observed California’s Proposition 13 campaign, to
propose circumventing the legislature by constitutional initiative.
Paul Gann, who authored Propositions 13 and 4, also advised Colorado’s amendment campaign, which culminated in 1992 when voters
passed a briefly-worded ballot initiative, the “Taxpayer’s Bill of
Rights,” constitutionally forbidding legislators from increasing state
revenue over that of a previous year, distributing the excess as taxpayer refunds. Rife with populist symbolism, the much longer, more
complex amendment text promised to “restrain most the growth of
government,” holding “limits on district revenue, spending, and debt
may be weakened only by future voter approval,” while financing taxpayer suits against legislative nonenforcement. Coloradans did not expect a decrease in public services, but predictably, the amendment’s
procrustean budget constraints hobbled the state government. By
2000, primary and secondary education funding plummeted to fortysixth nationally, forcing voters to pass an amendment exempting K-12
education spending. A 2001 recession then forced legislators to cut a
billion dollars from the state’s thirteen-billion-dollar budget, yielding
deep cutbacks to higher education, infrastructure, and child healthcare budgets, hampering child immunization, which voters also exempted in 2005. Across the states, lawmakers exempted necessary
hospital, university, public housing, and infrastructure projects from
debt caps, and allowed exempted entities to assume debt for nonexempt ones. Richard Briffault concluded that three-quarters of state
debt escaped these strict, if increasingly rhetorical, state constitutional constraints. Surveying these carveouts and the differences between state and federal budgeting processes, a 1993 General Office
report to the House Budget Committee concluded that state balanced
budget clauses were not a successful model for Congress to emulate.59
Congress failed to pass budget amendments in the 1990s. In November 1994, Republicans gained nine Senate seats and fifty-four
House seats on a fiscal restraint platform, and in 1995 proposed
twenty-nine balanced budget amendments, one of which cleared the
59. See COLO. CONST. 1876, art. X, § 20, amend. 1992; Vicky Bollenbacher, Two Sides
of Colorado, Amplified through Constitutional Redesign, in THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES , 603–08 (George E. Connor & Christopher W. Hammond eds., 2008); Briffault, supra note 57, at 217–21; BALANCED BUDGET
REQUIREMENTS: STATE EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1993); Franklin J. James & Allan Wallis, Tax and Spending Limits in Colorado, 24 PUB. BUDGET FIN. 16–33 (2004); Daniel A. Smith, Populist
Entrepreneur: Douglass Bruce and the Tax and Government Limitation Movemement in Colorado, 1986-1992, 6 GT. PLAINS RES. 269–94 (1996); O’SULLIVAN ET
AL., supra note 58.
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Republican House but failed in the Senate by a single vote. Congress
attempted alternate reforms, passing a House rule requiring a threefifths vote for tax increases and proposing ten item veto amendments.
As Reagan noted, nearly all governors had item vetoes—progressiveera state framers and voters had checked pork-barrel legislative appropriations through the gubernatorial item veto, constitutionalized
in forty-four states, and through governor-initiated budgets constitutionalized in several states.60 But none of the analogous federal
amendments cleared Congress, which in January 1997 instead passed
the Line Item Veto Act. The Supreme Court promptly rejected this in
1998, holding the item veto required an amendment, only seventeen of
which have since appeared on the congressional agenda. The item veto
remained a matter for the states. The Court meanwhile upheld California’s anti-tax initiatives.61
Congressional budget, tax, and item veto amendments and statutes failed against congressional opposition, Article V supermajority
requirements, and the Supreme Court. Reformers instead harnessed
popular sentiment to pass fiscal restraint measures through states’
laxer initiative processes. Applying only to state finance, these state
amendments could not address federal fiscal concerns or replace federal amendment proposals, but they did vent popular disaffection,
channeling discontent, and reform efforts, through the state initiative
process.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article details how reformers thwarted by Congress often instead realized their policy aims through state constitutional initiatives. Relative to the federal Constitution, the states uniformly impose
lower barriers to amendment, including by initiative. Reforms undertaken by state constitutional initiative can diffuse across state lines,
even to non-initiative states. Interstate convergence or divergence on
a constitutional policy can satisfy reformers and address national constitutional controversies, preempting or guiding subsequent congressional lawmaking.
We can draw a few lessons from this. First, on concurrent powers
matters, state initiatives can vent pressures for national constitutional reform. By framing a constitutional issue as a concurrent powers matter, reformers can strategically move between state and
federal venues, seeking the path of least resistance. Reformers may
blend paths, seeking a federal amendment or judicial ruling to bind
60. JOHN DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 113–23, 337–38
n.99, 102 (2006); DINAN, supra note 7, at 60–64.
61. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417 (1998); VILE, supra note 55, at 368–70, 456; KYVIG, supra note 40, at 443–47.
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the states, or failing this, reformers may campaign at the state level,
using state constitutional initiatives to achieve their policy aims.
States may diverge, settling on diverse outcomes. In the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s, many, but not all states, implemented or maintained fiscal
reform measures. This divergent, checkerboard outcome can offer a
stable national solution, making congressional or federal judicial intervention unnecessary. Alternately, the states may converge on a single policy. In the case of the Seventeenth Amendment, reformers used
the state constitutional initiative to better implement direct senatorial election, building an interstate electoral and legislative coalition
that pushed the Amendment through the Senate. Through divergence
or convergence, state constitutional reform broadly, and state constitutional initiatives specifically, can vent pressure for national constitutional reform.62
Second, as a corollary, state constitutional initiatives can cause
outcomes ascribed to federal lawmakers. A history of the passage of
the Seventeenth Amendment that focused solely on congressional bargaining or presidential leadership would miss how state constitutional
initiatives reshaped the selection, makeup, and policy interests of
United States senators, helping Congress form the bicameral
supermajorities needed to pass a federal amendment for direct senatorial election. In ignoring state constitutional initiatives, we would not
only mischaracterize the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, but
also mischaracterize the role of Congress in passing the Amendment.
That is, in ignoring state constitutionalism, we risk misunderstanding
national constitutional politics.
States pose low bars to amendment, including by initiative. Initiatives empower reformers to constrain noncompliant state legislators,
and on concurrent powers matters, to circumvent federal legislators.
Resulting state constitutional reform is often varied, incorporating
measures absent at the federal level. This variety and idiosyncrasy
deserve study so that we may better understand not only the state
constitutions, but also the federal Constitution.

62. For further development of these claims, see WOODWARD-BURNS, supra note 1, at
1–10.

